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Summary 
This paper shows that cities made more compact by transportation taxation are more 
robust than spread-out cities to shocks in transportation costs. Such a shock, indeed, 
entails negative transition effects that are caused by housing infrastructure inertia and 
are magnified in low-density cities. Distortions due to a transportation tax, however, 
have in absence of shock detrimental consequences that need to be accounted for. The 
range of beneficial tax levels can, therefore, be identified as a function of the possible 
magnitude of future shocks in transportation costs. These taxation levels, which can 
reach significant values, reduce city vulnerability and prevent lock-ins in under-optimal 
situations. 
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Coordinating housing needs and mobility practices in cities with high vs. low
densities constitutes the centre of a major controversy in architecture and
urban planning; compact cities found with Le Corbusier (1924) their most
fervent partisan, while extreme dispersion of housing was advocated by F. L.
Wright (see Jenks et al., 1996). As urban sprawl became a strong tendency
in developed countries, economists entered this debate, and began to ana-
lyze density in terms of environmental consequences and energy consumption:
Newman and Kenworthy (1989) for instance found a negative relationship be-
tween density and per capita energy consumption. This seminal paper was
the origin of a lively debate in the economic literature, and these results were
challenged, for example by Gordon and Richardson (1995).
While this literature focused on long term relationships, the rst innovation
of our paper is that it concentrates on short- and medium-run evolutions: we
argue that, over those timescales, spread-out cities are more vulnerable than
compact cities when confronted with an abrupt increase in their transportation
costs. This vulnerability arises from the facts (i) that urban forms are adapted
to transportation systems and costs (Brueckner and Fansler (1983), Yacovissi
and Kern (1995), Song and Zenou (2006)), and (ii) that housing infrastructures
have a strong inertia (Mayer and Somerville, 2000). As a consequence, any
change in transportation costs induces a slow change in urban infrastructures,
which can only take place over very long time scales. Gusdorf and Hallegatte
(2007), hereafter referred to as GH07, show that, as long as housing capital
has not been adapted, the transition that takes place has signicant impacts
on households and landowners.
Moreover, energy shocks and climate policies are characterized by imperfect
foresight at the timescales relevant to building turnover, which makes the de-
sign of urban policies particularly dicult. Here, therefore, we make the case
for using robustness in face of multiple scenarios, instead of eciency in one
scenario, as the criterion to manage urbanism. This method could help cities
to face the future and uncertain challenges related to constraints on fossil
energy resources, to geopolitical instability in oil producing countries, or to
climate policies. Transport policies leading to more compact cities, e.g. trans-
port taxation or speed limitation, can be seen as an insurance in this context
of imperfect foresight. For instance, Akerman and Hojer (2006) indicate that
climate policies call for a change in built-up areas, and that an appropriate
transport policy shall be exible enough to allow for adaptation when more
information is made available on the climate.
In this perspective, the impacts of transportation taxes are more than ever a
crucial issue for policy makers. A robust nding of prospective energy models
2is that abatement costs of CO2 emissions will be much higher in the trans-
portation sector than in other sectors (Parry, 2006). Indeed, eciency gains
of vehicle trigger an important rebound eect on gasoline demand. Also, as
transportation amounts to 19.3% of the average American household's expen-
ditures (O'Toole, 2003), welfare consequences of taxing gasoline can rapidly
become signicant. Economic agents have little room to adapt their behavior
to an increase in oil costs: rst, it is dicult to nd alternative less carbon-
intensive transportation technologies. Second, housing prices, rms localiza-
tions (Schafer, 1998), behavioral regularities (Schafer, 2000) and previous in-
frastructure choices (Crassous et al., 2006) constrain the transportation needs.
Hourcade and Gilotte (2000) mention the importance of urban forms for the
design of appropriate carbon taxes, but do not represent the spatial eects of
such a tax. A second originality of our paper is that it lls in this gap.
Using urban microeconomic modeling and numerical simulations, we show
that: (1) cities with pre-existing high transportation tax levels are less vulner-
able to energy shocks, and better prepared to future climate policies; in other
cities, housing inertia will induce signicant transition eects, such as a fall
in utility level, a decrease in landowners' incomes, and unintended redistribu-
tive eects between households and landowners; (2) if housing infrastructures
are rigid, early taxation can prevent the lock-in of cities in detrimental urban
forms. From a normative point of view, we follow Lempert (2006) who claims
that decision-makers should be provided with information on the robustness
of their strategies with respect to the risks that they are wiling to take or to re-
ject. In this framework, we show that (3) due to redistributive eects between
categories of actors, and between generations, the tax level a government may
choose is strongly dependent on the nature of the optimality criterion (utili-
tarian vs. Rawlsian), and on the weight attributed to each category of actors;
(4) the implementation of transportation tax is itself an event that may induce
negative transition eects, which can, to a certain extent, be avoided thanks
to a smooth implementation path.
In the following, we set a theoretical framework suited to the analysis of trans-
portation shocks in Section 2. Following GH07, we explicitly represent housing
inertia so as to analyse the eects of such a shock. The basic urban model is
only briey reproduced, since its main features have been well studied in the
economic literature. In Section 3, we use this model to evaluate the eects of
a shock on transportation prices, and show that cities with high preexisting
taxation levels are more robust to shocks. In Section 4, we characterize the
tax levels that should be chosen by a welfare-maximizing government. Finally,
Section 5 concludes on the consequences for mitigation policies, and provides
insights for future research.
32 The model
We use a standard urban economics modeling framework  a la Von Thuenen,
(Von Thuenen, 1826), as adapted by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth
(1969). More precisely, we use the close city model with absentee landowners
specied in Fujita (1989), and the housing production function introduced by
Muth. Since the basic properties of this model, and the relationships on which
it relies, have been presented in other papers (e.g. Wheaton, 1974), we do
not provide here an extensive description of those characteristics. We briey
present in Section 2.1.2 the behavior of the economic agents, and list in Section
2.1.3 the relationships dening the equilibriums we introduce in Section 2.1.4.
A nomenclature is provided to the reader in Section 2.1.1.
2.1 The Closed City Model with taxation
2.1.1 Nomenclature
CBD Central Business District, where rms are located r distance from CBD
q housing service per household s land area per household
k housing capital per household z composite good
Land(r) available land surface at distance r K capital
n(r) density of households at distance r T(r) transportation costs
Y income per capita rf city frontier
RH(r) unit housing service rent Ra agricultural land rent
H(r) total housing service at distance r h(r) housing service density
U(z;q) utility function of a household u utility level
 tax level  discount factor
x(r) optimal capital-to-land ratio  capital price
F(K;L) housing service production function  tax product
Table 1
Symbols and variables
The variables and functions used in this modeling are listed in Tab. 1 with
their signications. Among this set of variables, we specify the housing service
density h(r) = H(r)=Land(r) = f(x(r)), where the function f is dened by
f(x) = F(1;x).
The function T(r) represents generalized transportation costs, that take into
account the cost of transportation itself as well as the cost of the time spent in
4commuting, which could have been devoted to work. Marginal transportation
cost is assumed to be constant, and no congestion is taken into account, even
though it is an important phenomenon (see e.g. Mayeres and Proost, 2001).
We assume that the government sets a tax level per km of commuting T(r).





and we will assume that it is lump-sum redistributed to all workers. This
tax level is not intended to pay for investments and infrastructure operating,
which we assume to be included in transportation costs T(r).
As a consequence, the new transportation price and the new income of those
workers are, giving the subscript \a" to ancient parameters:
T(r) = Ta(r)(1 + )




Each household is composed of one worker commuting every day to the CBD.
All workers earn the same income Y , and enjoy utility from a composite good
z and a housing service q. All workers share the same utility function U(z;q).
Each worker chooses his/her housing location r in the city, where the unit
price of housing service at location r is RH(r). He/she maximizes his/her
utility level under a budget constraint:
maxr;z;q U(z;q) s.t. z + RH(r)q  Y   T(r) (3)
Absentee landowners
A landowner allocates his/her amount of land L to agricultural use or to
residential use. In the rst case, the rent drawn from the land will be Ra:L.
In the second case, the landowner invests in housing capital K to produce a
housing service H. Function F is assumed to have constant returns to scale.
3 Note that while T(r) is a generalized transportation cost (i.e. including the cost
of time), the tax T(r) is fully monetary.
5The investment decision of a landowner who owns land surface L at location




[RH(r)F(L;K)   K] (4)

















We dene two kinds of static equilibriums that are likely to emerge, depending
on whether housing supply is endogenous or exogenous. Several relationships
characterize those equilibriums.
If housing supply is exogenous:







q for r  rf





H(r)=q(r;u) for r  rf







If housing supply is endogenous, we need to add:
x(r) = argmaxx [RH(r)f(x)   x]





Land(r)  f(x(r)) for r  rf
0 for r  rf
RH(rf)H(rf)   K(r) = RaLand(rf)
(7)
62.1.4 Denitions
Denition 1 (CSExt) A competitive equilibrium with tax and ex-
ogenous housing (or CSExt) is reached in the city when, for a given set
of parameters N, Ya, RA, , and for given functions H(r), and Ta(r), one
can nd parameters and functions u, Y , , rf, n(r), T(r), RH(r), and z(r)
verifying Eqs. (1), (2) and (6).
Denition 2 (CSEnt) A competitive static equilibrium with tax and
endogenous housing (or CSEnt) is reached in the city when, for a given
set of parameters N, Ya, RA, , and for given functions Land(r) and Ta(r)
and F(L;K), one can nd parameters and functions u, Y , , rf, n(r), T(r),
RH(r), z(r) and H(r) verifying Eqs. (1), (2), (6) and (7).
2.2 The city structure
A transportation tax has two eects on urban sprawl, namely on rf, and
on consumers welfare. On the one hand, if a positive tax is implemented,
transportation prices are higher, which shrinks the city boundary, and reduce
households' utility (see also Wheaton, 1974). On the other hand, the product
of this tax is positive, and is lump-sum distributed to consumers. Thus, the
income of the representative household increases, which improves consumers
utility and expands the city outwards.
Brueckner (2005) shows that the rst eect is the strongest on urban sprawl:
a positive tax shrinks the city boundary. What is the optimal subsidy or
taxation level on commuting for consumers utility level? Brueckner asks the
question but cannot tell whether optimal taxation is positive or negative; he
recommends exploring the question with specic functional forms, beginning
with CES and Cobb-Douglas. We do such an analysis with Cobb-Douglas
functions, and show that there is an optimal subsidy for households' utility
level, partly answering Brueckner's questioning.
To do so, we use the following functional forms, classically used in urban
7economics (see e.g. Fujita, 1989) 4 :
U(z;q) = zq where ;  > 0 and  +  = 1





For the numerical simulations presented in this paper, we calibrated our model
on the Los Angeles agglomeration: 4:3 million workers earn a $20;700 yearly
income (data U.S. Census Bureau 1999). We use an estimate of transportation
price using 1999 gasoline prices (i.e. 32 cents per km on average, data Amer-
ican Automobile Association 1999), which is a lower bound of transportation
costs. Coecient , introduced in Eq. (8), represents the share of households
budget devoted to housing and related expenses (housing equipment, heating,
...), which we set at 25%. For the construction function, we lack robust em-
pirical evaluation, and used A = 1 and a = 0:5. To assess the robustness of
our results, we carried out systematic sensitivity analyses that show that all
qualitative results of the model remain the same in the range of reasonable
parameter values.
2.2.1 Tax eect on the city
A high tax level, which increases the transportation price, makes locations
far from the CBD less sought after, and those close to the CBD more sought
after: consumers agree to pay higher rents to get closer to the CBD, even if it
means that they have to put up with smaller ats. Therefore, the rent curve is
steeper, and landowners invest accordingly. Figure 2.2.1 shows that, through
this mechanism, taxation level inuences strongly urban structure.
2.2.2 Landowners
At the aggregate level, landowners are insensitive to transportation prices, but
they are sensitive to the level of taxation:
ALI =
NYa(1 + )
( + 3) + ( + 1)
(9)
4 We analytically show in Appendix 6.2.2 that, with these functional forms, there






















q = + 0.5
Fig. 1. Left: housing density h(r) corresponding to dierent tax levels  (index
h(0) = 1 for zero tax). Right: housing structure H(r) as a function of the tax level
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Fig. 2. The Aggregate Land Income, corresponding to dierent tax levels (index
ALI = 1 for zero tax).
A tax on transportation creates a market distortion: it gives households an
incentive to commute less and to spend a larger share of their budget on
housing services and other consumer goods. Figure 2 shows that a tax on
transportation increases aggregate landowners' income.
2.2.3 Tax eects on households






p2 (1 + )

  + 3
( + 3) + ( + 1)
+2
(10)
The tax or subsidy has two eects on households' utility. On the one hand,
a tax increases transportation price, which decreases utility. On the other
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Fig. 3. Impact of a tax  on utility u (index u = 1 for  = 0).
Of course, the two eects are exactly opposite when the tax is a subsidy. With
the functional forms we use, the optimal balance between these two eects
is reached for a unique subsidy level, corresponding to the maximum of the






It is noteworthy that the optimal tax level is strictly negative: households are
given an incentive to commute more, and spend less money on housing 5 .
We now introduce a monetary equivalent to consumers' utility 6 :
Denition 3 (Equivalent income) In a city where the income is Yequi(u;T(r)),
where the transportation cost function is given by T(r), and where the govern-
ment sets the optimal tax level  = , consumers reach the utility level u.
This monetary equivalent will be useful in the analysis of government's de-
cisions. A utilitarian government taking into account absentee landowners
would maximize a Static Global Welfare (SGW(u;T(r))) expressed in mone-
tary terms as the sum of landowners' income and of the equivalent income of
consumers:
SGW(u;T(r)) = N:Yequi(u;T(r)) + ALI (12)
5 This subsidy can for instance consist in the free access to roads and highways
nanced by a tax independent of individual transportation behavior.
6 We prefer not to use the criterion specied by Herbert and Stevens (1960): as
energy shocks may have an inuence on all cities as well as on rural population, we
do not want to depend on the existence of a reservation utility. Therefore, we rather
dene an equivalent income.
10If the optimal tax level is dened as the level that maximizes SGW, and if
ALI is lump-sum redistributed to consumers, we nd (see Appendix 6.1.5)
that the optimal tax level is zero 7 .
3 Compared vulnerability to external transportation shocks
Since our goal is to investigate the vulnerability of cities to shocks in trans-
portation costs, we assume in this section that at one point in time, the trans-
portation costs increase instantaneously from an initial value pi to a nal value
pf.
If housing capital is xed, GH07 show that the transportation shock eects
are worse than under the malleability assumption (in the latter case, housing
infrastructures adapt instantaneously). They nd that this worsening is not
negligible, and entails also important distributive eects between landowners
and households, and among landowners. They do not account, however, for
the eects of taxation levels. In the remaining of this section, we analyze a
situation where households and landowners adopt a myopic behavior, in a city
where a pre-existing taxation level  has been implemented. To analyze cities
with dierent taxation levels, we compare the medium-run situation with a
long run equilibrium where the optimal taxation level  is implemented. We
use this nal period as a common reference to study the medium-run eects
of dierent values of i, the initial value of the tax.
3.1 Accounting for inertia during the transition
We consider three periods: (1) the initial period, before the shock, during
which the city is assumed to be at its long-run equilibrium with a transporta-
tion price p and a tax level i. (2) The nal period, during which the city is
at its new long-run equilibrium, fully adapted to the new transportation price
pf and a tax level . This period takes place a long time after the shock, at
least several decades: based on Jin and Zeng (2004), the buildings turnover in
an American city is complete in 60 to 70 years. (3) An intermediary period, or
medium period. Goodwin et al. (2004) review the literature on the response
to transportation cost changes, and nd a short-term response taking place
within approximately 5 to 10 years after the shock 8 . Thus, the medium pe-
7 This also the optimal tax level that Brueckner (2005) nds for a classical Herbert-
Stevens criterion.
8 Due to the timescales we consider, what we call here a \short-term" response is
for Goodwin et al. (2004) a long-term response.
11riod takes place approximately between one decade after the shock and a few
decades after the shock.
During the medium period, the housing-supply structure is not adapted to the
new transportation price, because of the long adjustment delay in buildings
and city structure. Households, on the other hand, have adjusted their behav-
ior to the new transportation price and the available housing infrastructure
(see GH07).
Variables and parameters corresponding to these periods will be characterized
by a subscript i, f, or m. In the initial period, households and landowners
make their decisions as if pi should not change. We test dierent values of i
so as to evaluate the potential for anticipation through a tax in the initial
period.
Hence,
(1) initial period is characterized by a CSEnt with transportation price pi
and a tax level i;
(2) medium period is characterized by a CSExt with transportation price pf,
a tax level f =  and a housing structure inherited from the initial
period: Hm(r) = Hi(r).
(3) nal period is characterized by a CSEnt with transportation price pf and
a tax level f = ;
3.2 Eects on landowners
Section 2.2.2 established that, in the initial period, landowners' income un-
ambiguously gets larger as i increases. In the medium run, however, a larger
i has two eects on ALIm:
(i) initial investment is higher, which decreases ALIm;
(ii) housing is more and more concentrated towards the CBD (see Eq. (17)),
where people devote less money to commuting, and more to housing. As a
consequence, the aggregate housing rent is also larger in the medium run,
which increases ALIm.
What is the balance between those two eects? Figure 4 shows that ALIm
decreases with respect to i when i < 0:2; above this value, a larger i induces
a higher ALIm. Thus, there is a worst value of initial tax level for landowners
during the medium period. In that case, ALIm is 21% lower than ALIf. Beyond
this worst value, a larger i induces higher aggregate income in both the initial















Fig. 4. For a doubling of transportation price, impact of i on ALI (index
ALIf = 100).










Fig. 5. For a doubling of transportation price, the impact of tax levels i on utility
levels ui, um and uf (index ui = 1 for i = ).
In the medium run, Fig. 5 shows that, for i < 1, consumers benet from a
larger i. Beyond this value, they lose from it. When the taxation level in the
initial period increases beyond this threshold, consumers utility decreases both
in the initial and in the medium period. Thus, the situation of households is
the opposite to that of landowners.
3.4 Vulnerable and robust cities
Previous results suggest that cities' vulnerability is not a concept that can
be handled without distinguishing between several categories of agents. For
instance, for a shock corresponding to a doubling of transportation prices,
Tab. 2 shows the diverging interests of landowners and households:
13results are in % i =  < 0 i = 1 i = 2
ALIm ALIf
ALIf (Landowners)  20  17:2  10:8
um uf
uf (Households)  3:4 +1:1 0
Table 2
For a doubling of transportation price, the situation of agents in the medium run,
relative to the nal situation, for various levels of i.
A city with an initial subsidy to commuting (i = ) is very vulnerable
over the medium run to a transportation price shock: households support a
 3:4% utility loss compared to the nal period, while landowners suer from
a  20% decrease in their income compared to the nal period. Those losses
would be reduced in a city where preexisting taxation levels are higher: for
i = 1, landowners' aggregate loss is reduced to  17:2%, while households
are actually better o during the transition than at the nal stage. An even
higher i would be preferred by landowners, but is detrimental to households.
Thus, if a government decides to send a signal price to economic actors so
as to anticipate the possibility of a future shock in transportation prices, our
results indicate that there are positive tax levels that lead to less vulnerable
cities.
Choosing i, therefore, inuences the urban form (spread-out vs. compact) in
a crucial manner. A lock-in eect is likely to happen with low transportation
costs and no taxation. Once the city has gone through an urban sprawl process,
turning back to a more compact urbanism is a long and costly transition.
Moreover, the larger the inertia of housing capital, the most important for
welfare is the medium period, since initial tax level i shapes then the urban
forms for a longer period of time.
4 Normative aspects
The normative evaluation shall take into account not only the medium run
period following the shock, but also the eects of i on the initial, pre-shock,
period. Furthermore, actors that are to be taken into account in these criteria
may also dier according to local institutions.
4.1 Robust vs. vulnerable strategies
In view of Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the determination of a socially optimal tax i
proves dicult:
14(i) For a same actor (a household, or a landowner), changing i may have
opposite eects in the initial period and in the medium period.
(ii) In a given period, changing i may have opposite eects on two categories
of actors.
Furthermore, the uncertainty in future transportation costs, and the subse-
quent impossibility of perfect foresight, makes this situation even more com-
plex. Lempert et al. (2004), for example, claim that the deep uncertainties sur-
rounding climate change issues should lead decision-makers to choose strate-
gies with the most acceptable vulnerabilities. Here, we have to assume that
the government does not know several decades in advance the magnitude of
the shock(s) that it will have to face. In such a situation, it may be more
useful not to look for an optimal tax, but rather to characterize the situations
in which a given tax level i has a positive impact on the welfare criterion,
compared with the \do-nothing" strategy i = 0. To do so, we will assess, for
each shock amplitude, which tax levels are benecial or detrimental.
In what follows, we present a utilitarian and a Rawlsian criterion, which, as
we will see, lead to dierent recommendations for policy action.
The utilitarian criterion
If only consumers utility is accounted for, the utilitarian government's welfare
criterion is represented by:
W
U
C = ui + (1   )um
where  and (1   ) are the relative weights the government places on the
situations in period i and m. The actual value of  depends on the time
at which the shock will occur and on the preference for the present. In the
following, we assume that the time of the shock is known (i.e.  is known),
while its magnitude is uncertain. Adding uncertainty on time is possible within
our framework, but it does not change the qualitative results of our study.
If the government takes into account not only the well-being of households, but
also the wealth of landowners, the optimality criterion is modied accordingly,
taking into account SGW as dened in Eq. (12). The government maximizes




CL = IGW = SGW(ui;pi) + (1   )SGW(um;pm)
Let us set  = pf=pi as the magnitude of the shock. Figure 6 shows, for the
utilitarian criterion and for each shock , the tax levels i that have benecial
consequences compared with no pre-existing taxation. Two cases are studied,
15Fig. 6. Impact of i for a utilitarian government ( = 1=2): green areas correspond
to the couples (i,) that ensure a better outcome than (0,) for W U
C (C) and W U
CL
(CL) respectively. In red areas, both criteria perform worse than i = 0.
depending on the weight that is attributed to landowners' income. It appears
that a subsidy to commuting is never benecial for W U
CL, and is benecial for
W U
C only for low values of : this property emphasizes that very spread-out
cities are particularly vulnerable to transportation shocks.
If a value i > 0 is benecial for W U
C , then it is also benecial for W U
CL, but
the opposite is not true. Two reasons explain this asymmetry: rst, low initial
(positive) values of i prot to consumers in both periods, while they induce
gains for landowners in the initial period that are sucient to compensate for
their losses in the medium run. Second, high values of i induce smaller utility
levels for consumers, but larger landowners' income in both initial and medium
periods (see Figs. 4 and 5 for example, which illustrate the case  = 2).
The rawlsian criterion















if landowners' income is also taken into account.
Corresponding results are presented in Fig. 7. As in the utilitarian case, the
choice of i is more restricted for WC than for WCL. Also, compared to the
16Fig. 7. Impact of i for a utilitarian government ( = 1=2): green areas correspond
to the couples (i,) that ensure a better outcome than (0,) for W R
C (C), and for
WR
CL (CL) respectively. In red areas, both criteria perform worse than i = 0.
utilitarian case, high tax levels are a more robust choice in this Rawlsian
case. This is so because an intertemporal maximin takes into account only
the medium period, where consumers utility is always lower than in the initial
period, at least fot the values of i and  that we explored.
Following the Lempert's methodology, therefore, we showed, for each pos-
sible future transportation price, the rst-period tax levels that are bene-
cial, for two possible criteria. We claim that, based on these results, decision-
makers can implement informed policies, as a function of their beliefs on future
changes and of political parameters and value judgments.
4.2 The implementation of a transportation tax
Our results have pragmatic policy implications: it is possible to make a city
more robust with respect to future possible changes in transportation prices.
Taxing in advance transportation sends to consumers and landowners an ap-
propriate signal-price. In particular, cities that are being built now (as is the
case in developing countries where demography is increasing at a tremendous
pace) should take into account the possibility of future price increases. They
should thus build housing infrastructures that are more robust to the possibil-
ity of an increase in energy prices. Implementing an appropriate tax is a way
to do so.
In cities where housing is already adapted to low energy prices, such as north-
17ern American cities, however, reaching a less vulnerable equilibrium shall be
done with caution: implementing abruptly a new transportation tax is also a
shock that can be detrimental. Nevertheless, a shock due to a tax is dierent
from a shock due to an increase in energy prices, since the tax product is
lump-sum redistributed to consumers. Thus, they pay higher transportation
prices, but the tax product is added to their income 9 . As shown in Fig. 8,
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Fig. 8. Impact of a tax  vs. a price p0 = p(1 + ) on utility u (index u = 1 for
 = 0).
Nevertheless, we show in this section that a tax implementation induces a tran-
sition period that also calls for anticipation. In a new numerical experiment,
the transportation price p is constant while the tax level is the only changing
variable. Again, we consider three periods: the initial period when the tax
level is i = ; the medium period where the chosen tax level f has already
been set, but housing infrastructure is not adapted yet (Hm(r) = Hi(r)); and
a nal period, where the tax level is f, and where housing infrastructure is
adapted to this new signal-price.
Households: starting from a CSEnt where i = , households cannot gain
from a change in tax levels as long as transportation price p stays at the same
level. Figure 9 shows that this deterioration of their situation can be deepened
during the medium period. Since the tax product is lump-sum redistributed,
however, the consequences of a shock remain limited. 10
Landowners: setting a transportation tax creates a market distortion, which
leads households to choose locations where they have to commute less, but
pay higher rents. Rents close to the CBD increase, and they decrease far from
the CBD. In the long run, this mechanism increases aggregate housing rents,
9 Figure 8 shows for instance that a doubling of the price through a tax  = p
induces a 10% loss of utility, while a transportation cost p0 = 2p induces a 16% loss.
10 For instance, for f = 1, households are better o during the transition. For
f = 2, the amplication of consumers utility losses during the transition is 3:7%.
18and aggregate housing capital stock. Thus, two eects impact ALIm compared
to ALIf: on the one hand, there is under-investment in the medium period,
while rents have already increased. This should push ALIm above ALIf. On
the other hand, the investments performed to adapt housing in the nal period
lead to higher aggregate rents, which pushes ALIf above ALIm. Both eects
increase with respect to the taxation level f. The right side of Fig. 9 shows
that the rst eect is the strongest for high f. However, these eects of the




















Fig. 9. Impact of tax levels f on - Left: utility levels um and uf. -Right: ALIm
compared to ALIf.
Our theoretical framework is not complex enough to treat the question of the
optimal path of the signal price. A follow-up paper using a continuous-time
model will cope with this question. Our results suggest, however, that the
implementation of a new tax level induces a transition that has contrasted ef-
fects for households and landowners, even though these impacts remain limited
compared with the eects of a shock in transportation costs.
5 Conclusion
Even though the controversy on compact vs. spread-out cities is far from
being closed, policy makers in most European countries have decided to adopt
a strong attitude on the subject, and to mitigate urban sprawl. This paper
adds an argument in favor of this decision. We do not pretend to give the exact
picture of the consequences of a transportation shock, but we have explored
the orders of magnitude at stake. Our results suggest that cities made more
compact by a transportation tax are signicantly more robust than others to
a shock in transportation price, in spite of the negative eect of the tax before
the shock.
11 For instance, for f = 1, transition gains are only 2.5% higher in the medium run
than in the medium run. For f = 2, the dierence is 6%.
19The reasons for this property are that (1) a tax can be introduced progressively
and its implementation can be managed, while an energy price shock cannot
be controlled; (2) a shock created by the introduction of a tax is mitigated
by the redistribution of the tax product while a shock on the transportation
price (or speed) is only detrimental. Moreover, the lump-sum redistribution
assumed in our model could, in a more realist framework, be sophisticated
to take into account the pre-existing tax structure. Alleviating labor charges,
for instance, could produce a so-called \double-dividend", in addition to the
benets described in this paper.
In our framework, for a doubling of the transportation costs, in a city with a
high pre-existing tax level (i = 1), households' utility is +1:1% higher in the
medium run compared to the nal utility with optimal taxation, and landown-
ers' income is decreased by  17:2%. With a lower pre-existing taxation level
(i = ), those gures are respectively  3:4% and  20%. The importance
of early taxation is even larger if housing capital is considered as xed once
it is built: low initial transportation costs determine a highly spread-out city,
locked in an under-optimal situation if transportation price increases. This
argument is critical in developing countries where cities experience (or will
experience) a rapid growth. Those cities are, to a certain extent, still to be
built, and future changes due to mitigation policies or resource constraints
should be taken into account as soon as possible.
In industrialized countries, raising tax levels in vulnerable cities may be a se-
rious problem. The reason is that housing infrastructure already exists, and
represents huge investments. This factor may help understand why US gov-
ernment is reluctant to implement a climate policy that would lead to non
negligible negative welfare eects in American particularly spread-out cities
during the transition towards a more robust equilibrium. Meanwhile, it is also
reasonable to think that housing inertia should not lead to inaction, but rather
to early commitments and progressive action. A well conceived transportation
system may be considered as an insurance against numerous risks, from energy
security to climate mitigation needs.
The modelling framework we used in this paper presents several important
limitations, that were already presented in GH07 (e.g. the absence of gen-
eral equilibrium feedback mechanisms, or the assumption that the city has
one unique CBD). In spite of these limitations, however, our results show
signicant stylised facts, which should be accounted for in more exhaustive
frameworks. Follow-up papers will progressively answer to several limitations,
in particular to focus on macroeconomic feedbacks and on a more realistic
description of the dynamics of moves, housing investments, and rent levels.
In a more general framework, two main insights for future research can be
drawn from our results. First, the use of taxation policies as a tool to antici-
20pate uncertain future changes in presence of transition costs; in this regard, the
timing of the tax implementation is an important aspect of taxation policies.
Second, this paper also encourages governments to take into account future
environment constraints in all domains of public policy, for instance by link-
ing urbanism, land-use, transportation and climate policies. This view calls,
therefore, for a \mainstreaming" of environmental concerns in public policy.
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226 Appendix
6.1 Relationships in a CSEnt
6.1.1 Characteristics of the Urban System
Setting  = 1
a   1 and B = (Ab)
1=a()1=a a
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Let us rst assume that there is no transportation tax set by the government.
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Right Hand Side of relation (14) is strictly decreasing with u as soon as u is
such that rf can be positive. The interpretation of the decrease of RHS of (14)
with u is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in u implies that N shall decrease,
i.e. some people shall leave the city.
236.1.3 Tax product
We consider now that a tax p per km of commuting is levied throughout the
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In addition, (14) can be rewritten:
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6.1.4 Housing structure
The construction throughout the city is given by the function:
H(r) = n(r;)q(r;) = lrF(1;k(r;)=s(r;)).
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where A0 is a constant depending on the parameters of the problem.
6.1.5 Lump-sum redistribution of ALI
In this section, we assume Ra = 0. If the product of the housing industry is
to be lump-sum redistributed to the city inhabitants, then Eqs. (1) , (5) and
24(14) determine ALI,  and u. As a result, these variables satisfy an extended
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From these relationships, we get: Y =
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which is maximum for  = 0.
6.2 Relationships in the medium-term equilibrium, with exogenous housing
structure
6.2.1 New households density
If the government sets a transportation tax pm during second period, housing
service consumption is now:
q(um;r) = u1=
m ([Y + m=N   pm(1 + m)r])
 =
and as a consequence:
nm(um;r) = H(r)=q(um;r).












25In order to simplify our notations, we write:
1
q(um;r) = J:(K   r)k, where J is a number depending on um and m, while K
depends on m and m, and k = =. One might notice that K = rfm.
6.2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the medium-term equilibrium
In this section, we cope with the question of the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium and the medium-term equilibrium. A CSExt, if it exists, can















where J is a number depending on um and pm; K =
Y +m=N
p(1+m) ; k = =;
we set C, D and d so as to reformulate (17): H(r) = C(D   r)d. Studying
a medium-term equilibrium is then equivalent to studying a solution to the
system (19), where C, D, d and k are exogenous, while J and K verify:
J = J0u 1=
m , J0 being exogenous,
0 < K =
Y +m=N
pm(1+m)  D
In addition, all those parameters and variables are positive.
We treat this problem as a system of two equations with two unknown vari-
ables, m=N and um. We set x = m=N, and consider the related equation














One might note that if there is a couple (x;u
m) verifying Eq. (19), then
clearly x must satisfy Eq. (20). Conversely, suppose there is a x verifying











, one can see
that (x;u
m) satises Eq. (19).
26Thus, both existence and uniqueness of a solution to Eq. (19) are equivalent
to existence and uniqueness of a solution to Eq. (20). Both sides of this rela-
tionship are continuous with respect to x. Assume for instance that m > 0.
Then, for x = 0, Left Hand Side is worth 0 while Right Hand Side is strictly
positive. Thus, the dierence between those two sides is strictly negative. For






kr(Y   pr)dr (21)
which is strictly positive. If m is negative, the same conclusion applies.
Thus, there is at least one x for which Eq. (20) holds, and the existence of an
equilibrium during the medium-run is proved. Furthermore, for m > 0 (resp.
< 0), he expression in Eq. (21) is strictly increasing (resp.decreasing) with x.
This proves the uniqueness of the solution to Eq. (20).
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